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Against Assisted Suicide - Even a
Very Limited Form
YALE KAMISAR*
Professor Robert Sedler is a leading constitutional law professor
and a well-known civil liberties lawyer. I think he is right about many
things. To cite but one example, I think he was right when he led the
ACLU's successful legal attack on certain University of Michigan re-
strictions on "hate speech."' But I cannot agree with him about physi-
cian-assisted suicide, no matter how narrowly he frames the issue.'
WHAT IS THE QUESTION?
Professor Sedler did not earn all the civil liberties victories he has
won without being a very effective advocate. And as a good advocate
he is well aware that, as Justice Frankfurter once said, "[o]n the ques-
tion you ask depends the answer you get."3 So to get the answer he
desires, Sedler frames the issue very narrowly. He speaks only of a
"right" or "liberty" to assisted suicide for "terminally ill patients" and
only for such patients who are "in the end stages of their terminal ill-
ness."4 But is there any principled way to so limit such a right or
liberty?
* Clarence Darrow Distinguished University Professor, University of Michigan
Law School. A.B. 1950, New York University, LL.B. 1954, Columbia University. This
article is an expanded and updated version of a talk delivered at the Symposium on
Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia sponsored by the University of Detroit Mercy and
held on Nov. 18, 1994. At several places I have drawn freely from my other writings
on the subject. I am indebted to University of Michigan law student Marc
Spindelman for his valuable comments.
1. See Judge Avern Cohn's opinion in Doe v. University of Michigan, 721 F.
Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989). But see generally CATHAUNE A. MAcKINNON, ONLY WORDS
(1993). "Hate speech" is a popular name for expression that stigmatizes or victimizes
an individual on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, or other
listed characteristics.
2. See Robert A. Sedler, Are Absolute Bans on Assisted Suicide Constitutional? I Say
No, 72 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 725 (1995) (in this issue, preceding this article).
3. See HENRYJ. FRIENDLY, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in BENCHMARKS 318-19 (1967).
4. Sediler, supra note 2, at 725 (emphasis added). Professor Sedler also tells us
that the Michigan criminal law prohibiting assisted suicide (a state law that has since
expired) was "specifically directed against the terminally ill." Id. I think this state-
ment is misleading in two respects.
First of all, the Michigan law was not specifically directed at people who commit
suicide without assistance, but at those who purposely aid another to commit suicide.
The law did not prohibit either suicide or attempted suicide, see MCH. COMP. LAWS.
ANN. § 752.1027 (West Supp. 1993), nor, for that matter, does any American criminal
law.
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Professor Sedler does not want us to think about the impact on
our society of establishing a right or liberty to physician-assisted sui-
cide, however limited (at first). He does not want us to think about
other situations where the case for assisted suicide may be equally
strong. He only wants us to focus on a very narrowly circumscribed set
of circumstances.
Why is that? I think it is because, as Sedler and his colleagues are
well aware, a severely circumscribed right to assisted suicide would
cause less alarm and command more support than a less restricted
one. Most of us balk at the notion of actively intervening to promote
or to bring about the death of innocent persons. But if only the termi-
nally ill and, still more narrowly, only those in the final stage of their
terminal illness, are afforded a right to assisted suicide, we can still
manage to reassure ourselves that such a development constitutes only
a very, very slight deviation from our social norms.
Thus, a proposal for a rigorously circumscribed right to assisted
suicide or a claim that the Constitution protects a very limited right to
assisted suicide is quite inviting; one might even say, seductive. And, if
I may quote Justice Frankfurter again, "[t] he function of an advocate
is . . . to . . . seduce . . .5
On second glance, Professor Sedler's proposal may be even more
narrowly circumscribed than I have indicated. Although early in his
However, the fact that there is no form of punishment acceptable for a "com-
pleted suicide" and that a criminal prohibition is "singularly inefficacious" to deter
attempted suicide:
Does not mean that the criminal law is equally powerless to influence the
behavior of those who would aid or induce another to take his own life.
Moreover, in principle it would seem that the interests in the sanctity of life
that are represented by the criminal homicide laws are threatened by one
who expresses a willingness to participate in taking the life of another, even
though the act may be accomplished with the consent, or at the request of,
the suicide victim.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.5 Commentary at 94,100 (Official Draft and Revised Com-
mentaries 1980).
In the second place, the Michigan law was not specifically aimed at the terminally
ill or those who help the terminally ill commit suicide. The law made it a felony for
anyone who knew that another person intended to commit suicide (whether that
other person was terminally ill or not, physically disabled or not, seriously ill or not)
to "provide the physical means" by which that other person committed suicide or to
"participate in a physical act" by which the other person did so. See George Annas,
Physician-Assisted Suicide - Michigan's Temporary Solution, 328 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1573,
1574 (1993).
If the Michigan anti-assisted suicide law was specifically directed at any group or
any person, it was aimed at Dr. Jack Kevorkian. And it is well known that at least some
of Kevorkian's patients (including his very first one) were not terminally ill, as that
condition is usually defined. See infra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
5. FELIX FRANKFURTER, FELIX FRANKFURTER ON THE SUPREME COURT 509, 511
(Philip B. Kurland ed. 1970).
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talk, he speaks only of the end stages of terminal illness,6 later on he
seems to require another factor-unbearable pain and suffering. On
two occasions, for example, he asks whether the government can force
terminally ill persons to suffer until they have breathed their "last ago-
nizing breath."7
I do not deny that one may imagine situations, or recall actual
ones, that constitute very dramatic, very compelling, cases for assisted
suicide (or active voluntary euthanasia for that matter). But I do not
believe that a narrow exception to the current prohibition against as-
sisted suicide would or could remain a narrow exception for very long.
As I shall try to show, I do not believe there is any principled way to
limit the right to physician-assisted suicide to the terminally ill even to
those suffering unbearable or great physical pain.
More generally, I share the conclusion of the New York State
Task Force on the Life and the Law that, although acts of assisted
suicide or active euthanasia may be "morally acceptable in exceptional
cases,"8 such cases cannot justify explicit changes in existing legal or
moral rules. 9
As might be expected, the twenty-four members of the New York
Task Force had different views about individual acts of assisted suicide
and euthanasia.10 Some members believed that "assisted suicide is
ethically acceptable in certain cases."" Nevertheless, these members
joined their colleagues in unanimously recommending that existing
law should not be changed to permit assisted suicide (or active volun-
tary euthanasia). 2 Every member of the Task Force concluded that
"the potential dangers of this dramatic change in public policy would
outweigh any benefit that might be achieved."'"
And, reported the Task Force, the dangers of such a change
would be the greatest for the elderly, the poor, and the socially
disadvantaged:
6. See Sedler, supra note 2, at 725, 727, 728.
7. See id. at 727, 728.
8. THE NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, WHEN DEATH Is
SOUGHT: ASSISTED SUICIDE AND EuTHANASIA IN THE MEDICAL CONTEXT 102 (1994)
[hereinafter NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE REPORT].
9. Seeid.
10. The Commission, appointed by Governor Mario Cuomo, was made up of
eight medical doctors (two of whom were deans of medical schools), two bioethicists
who were not medical doctors, four lawyers, six clergymen (one of whom was also a
law professor), the state commissioner of health, the state commissioner on the qual-
ity of care for the mentally disabled, and a member of the New York Civil Liberties
Union. In addition, three medical doctors and a nurse served as consultants. See /ti
at ii-iii.
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[I]t must be recognized that assisted suicide and euthanasia
will be practiced through the prism of social inequality and
prejudice that characterizes the delivery of services in all seg-
ments of society, including health care. Those who will be
most vulnerable to abuse, error or indifference are the poor,
minorities, and those who are least educated and least em-
powered. This risk does not reflect a judgment that physi-
cians are more prejudiced or influenced by race and class
than the rest of society-only that they are not exempt from
the prejudices manifest in other areas of our collective life.' 4
[Many patients] in large, overburdened facilities serving the
urban and rural poor... will not have the benefit of skilled
pain management and comfort care. Indeed, a recent study
found that patients treated for cancer at centers that care
predominantly for minority individuals were three times
more likely to receive inadequate therapy to relieve pain.
Many patients will also lack access to psychiatric services.
Furthermore, for most patients who are terminally or se-
verely ill, routine psychiatric consultation would be inade-
quate to diagnose reliably whether the patient is suffering
from depression.15
For similar reasons, not long ago (February, 1992), the ABA
House of Delegates rejected a resolution by the Beverly Hills Bar Asso-
ciation that would have supported a California ballot initiative to le-
galize physician "aid-in-dying." (The "aid-in-dying" label covered both
physician-assisted suicide and physician-administered active voluntary
euthanasia.)16 The opposition to the Beverly Hills resolution was led
by John Pickering, the Chair of the ABA Commission on Legal
Problems of the Elderly. I think a point Mr. Pickering made on that
occasion bears repeating:
[The resolution] calls for "voluntary aid in dying ... without
undue influence or duress. . . ." Before there can be such
truly voluntary choice to terminate life, there must be univer-
sal access to affordable health care. The lack of access to or
the financial burdens of health care hardly permit voluntary
14. Id. at 125 (footnote omitted).
15. Id. at 143 (footnotes omitted) (citing C. S. Cleeland et al., Pain and Its Treat-
ment in Outpatients with Metastatic Cancer, 320 N. ENG. J. MED. 592-96 (1994)).
16. See generally Alexander Morgan Capron, Proposition 161: What Is at Stake,
CoMMouwaFAL, Sept. 1992 (Special Supp.), at 2. The California proposal to legalize
"aid-in-dying" (Proposition 161) failed by a 54 percent to 46 percent margin. SeeAlex-
ander Morgan Capron, Even in Defeat, Proposition 161 Sounds a Warning, HASNGS
CENTER REP., Jan. - Feb. 1993, at 32.
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choice for many. What may be voluntary in Beverly Hills is
not likely to be voluntary in Watts. 1
7
IF A "RIGHT" OR "LIBERTY" TO PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE
WERE ESTABLISHED, WOULD (COULD) IT BE
LIMITED TO THE "TERMINALLY ILL"?
As I understand it, the basic argument for assisted suicide is "per-
sonal autonomy" or "self-determination" or, as Professor Sedler puts
it, paraphrasing the language in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,'" "the
right to define one's own concept of existence and to make the most
basic decisions about bodily integrity.'"19 But if one believes that re-
spect for "self-determination" and "personal autonomy" entitles a per-
son to decide for herself whether, when, and how she wishes to end
her life, I do not see any principled way in which this right or liberty
can be limited to the "terminally ill," let alone persons in the end
stage of a terminal illness.
According to Sedler, "[olbviously, the terminally ill person will not
seek to hasten inevitable death until the end stage of the terminal
illness has been reached."2" This is not at all obvious to me. It would
not surprise me, for example, if someone who learns she has terminal
cancer or is HIV positive would seek assistance in ending her life
shortly after she heard the bad news. It would surprise me even less if
someone in the early stages of Alzheimer's disease, anticipating and
fearing mental deterioration some years down the road, would seek
17. Mr. Pickering's arguments in opposition to the Beverly Hills resolution are
set forth in a memorandum ofianuary 17, 1992, which is quoted at length inJohn H.
Pickering, The Continuing Debate over Active Euthanasia, BIOETHICS BULLETIN (ABA),
Summer 1994, at 1, 2.
Shortly after I gave the talk on which this article is based, a conference partici-
pant, Dr. Ralph D. Cushing, who treats people with AIDS at Bon Secours Hospital in
Grosse Pointe as well as at Detroit Receiving Hospital, expressed the view that there is
a "racist" component to the issue of physician-assisted suicide. See Dave Farrell, As-
sisted Suicide A Troubling Divisive Issue for State Doctors, DErorr NEWS, Nov. 20, 1994, at
4C (reporting on the conference). According to Dr. Cushing, inner-city patients,
many of them poor African-Americans, would be most likely to seek and to obtain
physician-assisted suicide, if it were legal. See id. Explained Dr. Cushing: "It seems to
me that a person with less options for medical care is more likely to fall into despair.
And that is when these kinds of decisions are made-when the patient is depressed
and believes there is no hope." I&
See alsojohn D. Arras, The Right to Die on the Slippery Sope, 8 Soc. THEORY & PRAc.
285, 304 (1982) (predicting that if active voluntary euthanasia were made legal, most
dying patients in the middle and upper classes would probably opt for hospice care,
but "the poor, who because of their poverty, lack access to mainstream medical care
and the amenities of the hospice," would find euthanasia "much more attractive").
18. 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992). The language about defining one's own concept of
existence is discussed infra in the text accompanying notes 139-51.
19. Sedler, supra note 2, at 728.
20. Id. (emphasis added).
1995]
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assistance in ending her life before the disease progressed any further.
This, essentially, describes the plight of Janet Adkins, Dr. Kevorkian's
first "suicide patient.",
2 1
But someone in Janet Adkins' situation would not satisfy Profes-
sor Sedler's criteria because she would not be "terminally ill" as that
term is usually defined; if Adkins had not availed herself of Kevor-
klan's services, she "might easily have lived for many more years. "22
(Terminal illness is commonly defined as a condition that will pro-
duce death "imminently" or "within a short time" or in six months or
a year.)23
If there is some constitutionally protected right or liberty to de-
cide whether, when and how to end one's life-"to determine the tim-
ing of [one's] death"2 4-surely it would or should apply to someone
in Adkins' situation. Why should she have to walt until the final phase
of Alzheimer's disease? Does personal autonomy apply to matters of
life and death, or doesn't it?
It should be noted that Dr. Timothy Quill, a forceful and elo-
quent proponent of physician-assisted suicide, would not limit that
right to the terminally ill. As he explains, he does not want "to arbi-
trarily exclude persons with incurable, but not imminently terminal,
progressive illness."25 But why stop there? Is it any less arbitrary to
exclude the quadriplegic? The victim of a paralytic stroke? The man-
gled survivor of a road accident?
If personal autonomy and the termination of suffering are sup-
posed to be the touchstones for physician-assisted suicide, why ex-
clude those with non-terminal illnesses or disabilities who might have
to endure greater pain and suffering for much longer periods of time than
those who are expected to die in the next few weeks or months? If
the terminally ill do have a right to assisted suicide, doesn't someone
who must continue to live what she considers an intolerable or unac-
21. SeeJUDITH AHRONHEIM & DORON WEBER, FINAL PASSAGES: POSITIVE CHOICES
FOR THE DYING AND THEIR LOVED ONES 14-15, 36, 74 (1992); MICHAEL BETZOLD, AP-
POINTMENT WITH DOCTOR DEATH 41-46 (1993).
22. AHRONHEIM & WEBER, supra note 21, at 74. See also PETER SINGER, RETHINKING
LIFE AND DEATH 133 (1995) (Janet Adkins "knew that she might live another ten years
or more").
23. SeeYale Kamisar, When Is There a Constitutional "Right to Die"? When Is There No
Constitutional "Right to Live?", 25 GA. L. REV. 1203, 1210-11 (1991); Thomas Marzen,
"Out, Out Brief Candle": Constitutionally Prescripted Suicide for the Terminally I, 21 HAS-
TINGS CONST. L.Q. 799, 814 (1994). As pointed out in AHRONHEIM & WEBER, supra
note 21, at 74, "even by the standards of the Hemlock Society, of which [Adkins] was a
member, she was not 'terminal'-defined by the organization as having six months or
less to live ......
24. Sedler, supra note 2, at 728. Professor Sedler further states: "[T]he question
is whether [a terminally ill] person will have the choice to hasten inevitable death-to
determine the timing of death-or whether that person must continue to suffer until
she breathes her last agonizing breath." Id.
25. TIMOTHY QUILL, DEATH AND DIGNITY 162 (1993) (emphasis added).
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ceptable existence for many years have an equal-or even greater-
right to assisted suicide?
If a competent person comes to the unhappy but firm conclusion
that her existence is unbearable and freely, clearly and repeatedly re-
quests assisted suicide, and there is a constitutional right to some form
of assisted suicide, why should she be prevented from obtaining the
assistance of another to end her life just because she does not "qual-
ify" under somebody else's standards? Isn't this an arbitrary limitation
of self-determination and personal autonomy? As Daniel Callahan has
observed: "How can self-determination have any limits? [Assuming a
person is competent and determined to commit suicide with the assist-
ance of another,] [w]hy are not the person's desires or motives,
whatever they may be, sufficient ' 2
There is another reason I very much doubt that if a right to as-
sisted suicide were established for the terminally ill, it could and
would remain limited to the terminally ill for very long. As I under-
stand the position of Sedler and other proponents of a right to as-
sisted suicide, one should have the same ight to enlist the aid of
others to commit suicide as one presently has to refuse or to withdraw
life-sustaining medical treatment. Professor Sedler puts it quite
strongly. He sees no "principled difference, in terms of constitutional
doctrine and precedent," between the alleged right to assisted suicide and
the established right to terminate life support.27 (Nor did Barbara
Rothstein, Chief Judge of the United States District Court in Seattle,
who recently became the first federal judge to strike down, as violative
of the Fourteenth Amendment, a state law prohibiting all assisted
suicide.)2"
But if, as proponents of assisted suicide maintain, there is no sig-
nificant difference between the right to assisted suicide and the right
to reject unwanted life-saving treatment, it is fairly clear that, once
established, the right to assisted suicide would not be limited to the
terminally ill. For the right of a person to reject life-sustaining medi-
cal treatment has not been so limited.
One need only recall the Elizabeth Bouvia case,29 one of the best
known "right to die" cases in this country (probably the third most
26. DANmL CALLAHN, THE TROUBLED DREAM oF LiFE 107-08 (1993).
27. Sedler, supra note 2, at 729 (emphasis in original).
28. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp 1454 (W.D. Wash. 1994).
Several months after I gave my talk, Judge Rothstein's decision was reversed. See Com-
passion in Dying, 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1995). At one point in his opinion reversing
Judge RothsteinJudge Noonan, who wrote for a 2-1 majority, observed: "At the heart
of the district court's decision appears to be its refusal to distinguish between actions
taking life and actions by which life is not supported or ceases to be supported." Id. at
593. As this article went to press, the Ninth Circuit announced that the Chief Judge
and ten other members of the Court would rehear the case en banc. 62 F.3d 299
(1995).
29. Bouvia v. Superior Court (Glenchur), 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
1995]
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famous case in its field, behind only the Quinlan and Cruzan cases)."
At the time of the litigation, Ms. Bouvia, a young woman afflicted with
severe cerebral palsy, had a long life expectancy. Nor was she uncon-
scious or mentally impaired. Indeed, the court described her as both
"intelligent" and "alert."3 ' Nevertheless, she was granted the relief she
sought-the right to remove a nasogastric tube keeping her alive
against her wishes.
To be sure, neither the Bouvia case nor other cases upholding the
right of non-terminally ill persons to reject life-saving treatment 2
were decided by the United States Supreme Court. But Bouvia and
these other cases have been well received by bioethicists and medico-
legal commentators. As ProfessorJohn Regan pointed out at this sym-
posium, the highest court of New York and courts across the land have
come to recognize that patients have "a virtually absolute right to re-
fuse life-sustaining treatment, so long as they are competent in mak-
ing that choice."3§
In an effort to draw a bright line between the terminally ill and all
others who might seek help in committing suicide, Professor Sedler
contends that the state "cannot assert any conceivably valid interest"
34
in requiring a terminally ill person to wait until death comes naturally
because "there can be no valid interest in 'peserving life' when there is no 'lfe
left to preserve," 3 and "for the terminally ill there is no life left to preserve."36 I
must say I do not understand this argument.
A terminally ill person, for example, a cancer patient who, de-
spite our best medical efforts, is likely to die in a number of months, is
still a "person" or a "human being." Moreover, a terminally ill pa-
tient's mental powers can hardly be greatly impaired if she retains the
30. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990); In re Quin-
lan, 355 A.2d 647 (NJ. 1976).
31. See Bouvia, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 300, 305.
32. See Fosmire v. Nicoleau, 75 N.Y.2d 218 (N.Y. 1990); McKay v. Bergstedt, 801
P.2d 617 (Nev. 1990); State v. McAfee, 385 S.E.2d 651 (Ga. 1989); Thor v. Superior
Court (Andrews), 855 P.2d 375 (Cal. 1993). Fosmire sustained the right of a patient to
refuse blood transfusions following a Cesarean delivery despite the fact the patient
was responsible for the care of her infant. McKay and McAfee involved respirator-de-
pendent quadriplegics who apparently had long life expectancies. Thor involved a
state prison inmate, rendered quadriplegic as a result of a fall while in prison, who
refused to consent to medication or artificial feeding.
33. See remarks of John J. Regan at the University of Detroit Mercy Symposium
on Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia, November 18, 1994 (on file with the University of
Detroit Mercy Law Review). See also 1 ALAN MEISEL, THE RIGHT TO DIE 470 (2d ed. 1995)
(study of "new generation of right-to-refuse-treatment cases... leads to the conclu-
sion that the right of a competent person to refuse medical treatment is virtually
absolute").
34. Sedler, supra note 2, at 729.
35. Robert A. Sedler, The Constitution and Hastening Inevitable Death, 23 HASTINGS
CENTER REP., Sept. - Oct. 1993, at 20, 24 (emphasis in original).
36. Sedler, supra note 2, at 730.
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decision-making capacity necessary to invoke the right to assisted sui-
cide. (For the present, at least, proponents of assisted suicide are not
contending that incompetent persons should be entitled to enlist the
assistance of others in committing suicide.) Thus, if a right to assisted
suicide for the terminally ill were established, an individual could only
exercise such a right if she were capable of making a voluntary and
informed choice. How can it be said that such a person has "no life
left to preserve"?
To be sure, a terminally ill person may feel or honestly believe that
what is left of her life is not a "life" worth preserving. But so too may
many others suffering from serious illnesses or disabilities, who are
not terminally ill.
A person paralyzed from the neck down may forcefully argue
that, although she has a long life expectancy, she has less "life" to live
than a terminally ill person who, though seriously ill, is still better able
to function in society in the months she has left. The same argument
may be plausibly made by a multiple sclerosis patient who, though not
terminally ill, is so debilitated by her illness that she cannot move
from her nursing home bed or eat or perform bodily functions with-
out the assistance of others. Indeed, very recently, Professor Sedler
discussed the constitutional status of the multiple sclerosis patient de-
scribed above (I simply reproduced his description) and concluded
that she, as well as a terminally ill person, had a constitutional right to
suicide.37
At this symposium Professor Sedler has painted a bright line be-
tween the terminally ill and all others who seek assistance in commit-
ting suicide. But less than a year earlier he grouped together the
terminally ill and those who, though they "may live for some addi-
tional years,"3" are "so physically debilitated that for them life has be-
come unendurable,"3 9 maintaining that those falling into either
category should have a constitutional right to obtain the assistance
they need to end their lives by suicide.'
Is it any wonder that I do not believe that a right to assisted sui-
cide for the terminally ill will be confined to the terminally ill for very
long?
37. See Robert A. Sedler, Constitutional Challenges to Bans on "Assisted Suicide": The
Viewfrom Without and Within, 21 HASTNGS CoNsT. L.Q. 777, 791-93 (1994).
38. Id. at 792.
39. Id. at 793, 795. See also id. at 797.
40. See id. at 795: "[W]here it matters, bans on assisted suicide should be held to
be unconstitutional. These bans matter for people who are terminally ill and for peo-
ple who are so physically debilitated that for them life has become unendurable."
1995] 743
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CAN (SHOULD) THE RIGHT TO ASSISTED SUICIDE BE
LIMITED TO THOSE UNDERGOING GREAT "PAIN
AND SUFFERING"?
Although Professor Sedler's position on the issue is not perfectly
clear, a restriction frequently placed on the right to assisted suicide is
that the person asserting this right must be experiencing great "pain
and suffering" (two classifications commonly lumped together, but
hardly identical).
If this restriction means great physical pain, very, very few people
should qualify for assisted suicide. Although pain is notoriously under-
treated in this country,4 "according to experts in the field of pain
control, almost all terminally ill patients can experience adequate re-
lief with currently available treatments."42 Thus, the Memorial Sloan-
Kettering Cancer Center's Kathleen Foley, a well-known expert on
pain control, reports that suicidal ideation and suicide requests "com-
monly . . . dissolve with adequate control of pain and other
symptoms."4,
If the "pain and suffering" restriction means "suffering" (includ-
ing "psychological suffering"), not physical pain, we are no longer
talking about a relatively small, easily identifiable group. Physicians
can and should relieve physical pain, but "suffering" is a more com-
plex matter: "When euthanasia [or assisted suicide] is requested, the
doctor is being asked to act upon someone else's subjective suffer-
ing-variable from person to person, externally unverifiable, and al-
ways, in principle, reversible .... 4
41. See AHRONHEIM & WEBER, supra note 21, at 99-114.
42. Id. at 102.
43. Kathleen Foley, The Relationship of Pain and Symptom Management to Patient Re-
quests for Physician-Assisted Suicide,J. PAIN & SYMPTOM Mcmr. 289, 290 (1991). Adds Dr.
Foley, "The high cost of pumps, drugs, and home care supervision on a 24-hr basis
makes [pain control] only available to a limited number of patients who have appro-
priate health care coverage. By rationing pain management on a financial basis, pa-
tients are being forced to consider death as their only option." Id. at 292.
As Lord Goff of Chieveley recently recalled, when Dame Ciceley Saunders,
founder of the modem hospice movement, took the head of the British "Voluntary
Euthanasia Society round the hospice and explained her work to him", he wrote to
her afterwards that "'there would be little or no problem of euthanasia if all the
terminal disease folk could end their lives in that atmosphere you have done so much
to create-but alas that can hardly be for many a long year.' " Robert Goff, A Matter of
Life and Death, 3 MED. L. REv. 1, 18 (1995), (quoting SHIRLEY DU BouLAY, CIcELEY"
SAUNDERS 180 (rev. ed. 1994)).
44. CALLAHAN, supra note 26, at 102. See also Daniel Callahan & Margot White,
The Legalization of Physician-Assisted Suicide: Creating a Regulatoy Potemkin Village, - U.
RICH. L. REv. (forthcoming 1995):
No evidence could establish that a patient is not suffering the severe and
unrelenting suffering he claims, or which the doctor subsequently claims the
patient claimed.... Repeated requests for PAS [physician-assisted suicide]
do not prove suffering so much as they prove determination, and exactly this
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If a right to assisted suicide were established, how could this right
be denied an otherwise eligible person who says, indeed insists, that
her "externally unverifiable" suffering is intolerable? As a practical
matter, would we not defer to the patient's own assessment of her
suffering? As a matter of principle, shouldn't we?
So long as a person is competent and her desire to enlist the aid
of others in dying by suicide firm and persistent, why should her
"right" to end her life in the manner she chooses (if such a right ex-
ists) be denied because her suffering does not satisfy someone else's
standard?
If and when a right to assisted suicide is established, any require-
ment that the patient experience "unbearable" or "intolerable" suffer-
ing (or "pain and suffering") will probably turn on the patient's own
view of her suffering-or drop out entirely.45
WILL THE FINE LINE BETWEEN ASSISTED SUICIDE AND
ACTIVE VOLUNTARY EUTHANASIA ENDURE FOR
VERY LONG?
How does active voluntary euthanasia differ from assisted suicide?
Active voluntary euthanasia occurs when someone other than the per-
son who is to die performs the last act-the one that actually brings
about death. Assisted suicide takes place when another person pro-
vides assistance (for example, provides the physical means to commit
suicide), but the person whose life is to be ended performs the last,
death-causing act herself. "Recent [court] decisions draw a distinc-
tion between active participation in a suicide [murder] and involve-
ment in the events leading up to the suicide, such as providing the
means [assisted suicide]."'
Because assisted suicide is less widely condemned by the criminal
law and the fact that the final act is in the patient's hands is seen as
kind of determination would well serve to make primafacie plausible claims
that comfort care has failed-and there would be no way, in the face of a
patient's insistence that it had failed, to prove it had not.
45. Cf AlbertJonsen, To Help the Dying Die - A No Duty for Anesthesiologists , 78
ANFSTHESIOLOrGY 225, 227 (1993):
[F]ear of uncontrolled pain [and, I would add, "unbearable suffering"] is no
longer a major feature of the justifying arguments [for "aid-in-dying"]. Au-
tonomy, not pain or its merciful alleviation, is the principal and even sole
justifying argument offered by modem proponents.
46. People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714, 736 (Mich. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
714 (1995). The Kevorkian majority discusses, and seems to agree with, two cases from
other jurisdictions where the courts found the defendant guilty of murder (which is
how American criminal circles currently view active voluntary euthanasia) not assisted
suicide: People v. Cleaves, 280 Cal. Rptr. 146 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (defendant held
decedent down to keep him from falling off bed while decedent completed an act of
self-strangulation); States v. Sexson, 869 P.2d 301 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994) (defendant
held rifle in position while wife pulled trigger of rifle that killed her).
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offering more protection against potential abuse,47 assisted suicide
causes less alarm then active euthanasia and generally commands
more support. But I think the two practices are much more alike than
they are different-both involve the active intervention of another to
promote or to bring about death.
As I have spelled out in some detail elsewhere,48 one who looks at
the media's treatment of the legal and ethical problems raised by the
so-called right to die, or even the medico-legal literature on the same
subject, quickly discovers that the line between assisted suicide and
active voluntary euthanasia is often blurred and sometimes obliter-
ated. Moreover, the emergence of such phrases as "aid-in-dying" and
"physician-assisted death," terms which cover both assisted suicide and
active euthanasia,49 have further smudged the distinction between the
two practices.
While the distinction is hard to maintain in practice' ° it is even
harder to defend as a matter of principle. If a person who resolves to
47. See Herbert Hendin, Selling Death and Dignity, 25 HASTINGS CENTER REP., May -
June 1995, at 19.
48. See Yale Kamisar, Physician-Assisted Suicide: The Last Bridge to Active Voluntary
Euthanasia, in EuTHANAsIA EXAMINED 225, 230-33 (John Keown ed., 1995); Yale
Kamisar, Are Laws Against Assisted Suicide Unconstitutional, 23 HASTINGS CENTER REP.,
May -June 1993, at 32.
49. See authorities cited supra note 16 and accompanying text; infra text accompa-
nying note 55; see also Timothy E. Quill, The Care of Last Resort, N.Y. TIMES, July 23,
1994, at 15A (repeated use of the term "physician-assisted death").
50. Consider the following: A competent patient who has resolved to die by sui-
cide and made her wish clear accomplishes her purpose by swallowing a lethal dose of
medication which her physician has placed (a) on the night stand next to her bed,
(b) in her hand, (c) in her mouth. Has the physician committed murder (which is
how active voluntary euthanasia is currently regarded) or has she assisted in a pa-
tient's suicide? Compare Lawrence 0. Gostin, Drawing a Line Between Killing and Letting
Die: The Law, and Law Reform, on Medically Assisted Dying, 21 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 94, 96
(1993) with Kamisar, Physician-Assisted Suicide: The Last Bridge to Active Voluntary Eutha-
nasia, supra note 48, at 230-31.
It may be argued that when a physician puts a lethal dose of medication in a
patient's hand he is actively participating in an act that directly causes death. On the
other hand, it may be argued that when a physician puts the means of committing
suicide in a patient's hand, the lethal process has not yet become irreversible; the
patient can still change her mind and put the medication on her night stand or throw
it away instead of placing it in her mouth. However it comes out, the line between (a)
putting a lethal dose of medication in a patient's hand and (b) putting it on top of
her pillow or on her night table seems excruciatingly thin.
I think placing a lethal dose of medication in a person's mouth at her request
would strike many people as a clear case of active voluntary euthanasia. But suppose a
physician tells her patient: "I am going to place some lethal medication in your
mouth, but don't be in a hurry to swallow it. You still have a choice. It's your life. I'm
going to leave the room. If you decide that when all is said and done you do not want
to die by suicide, that is your right. Simply remove the substance from your mouth or,
if you prefer, spit it out." Suppose further that, after the physician leaves the room,
the patient swallows the medication. It is not at all clear to me that this is active
voluntary euthanasia rather than assisted suicide.
HeinOnline  -- 72 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 746 1994-1995
ASSISTED SUICIDE
end her life, but is unable to do so without another's help, is entitled
under certain circumstances to the assistance of another in bringing
about her own death, what about the person who is similarly deter-
mined to end her life but unable to perform the last, death-causing act
herself? Whey should she be denied the assistance of another in carry-
ing out the final act; i.e., denied active euthanasia?
If the claim that one has, or ought to have, a right to control the
time and manner of one's death is well founded-if one who is termi-
nally ill has, or ought to have, the right to make the choice whether or
not to go on living until death comes naturally-how can this right be
denied to someone simply because she cannot swallow the barbitu-
rates that will bring about death?
Physician-assisted suicide may be less alarming than physician-ad-
ministered active euthanasia and may be regarded as a lesser deviation
from our social norms, but once we cross the line between the rejec-
tion of life-sustaining medical treatment and the active intervention of
another to promote or to bring about death, I do not see how we
could (or why we would) stop short of active voluntary euthanasia.
Until recently, Dr. Timothy Quill and Dr. Diane Meier would
have disagreed with me. In 1992 they announced their support for
physician-assisted suicide (under certain conditions), but balked at ac-
tive voluntary euthanasia." Although Quill and Meier recognized
that excluding active voluntary euthanasia from "a continuum of op-
tions for comfort care" occurs at "a cost to competent, incurably ill
patients who cannot swallow or move, and who therefore cannot be
helped to die by assisted suicide,"52 they opposed legalizing any form
of active euthanasia "because of the risk of abuse it presents."53 Access
51. See Timothy E. Quill, et al., Sounding Board: Care of the Hopelessly Ill - Proposed
Clinical Criteria for Physician-Assisted Suicide, 327 NEw ENG.J. MED. 1380 (1992); see also
Quill, supra note 25, at 155-67. As Dr. Quill points out, much of the 1992 article he
co-authored is reproduced in chapter eight of his 1993 book. Id. at 155.
52. Quill et al., supra note 51, at 1381.
53. Id. According to Dr. Quill and his co-authors, because in assisted suicide "the
final act is solely the patient's," and thus "the risk of subtle coercion from doctors,
family members, institutions, or other social forces is greatly reduced," the "balance of
power between doctor and patient is more nearly equal in physician-assisted suicide
than in euthanasia." Id. But see Callahan & White, supra note 44:
Notably, arguments of [the kind made by Dr. Quill and his co-authors] do
not cite any empirical studies to show there is less coercion and a greater
balance of power. There are no such studies. The claim is pure assertion,
and not a very plausible one at that. To insinuate the idea of suicide into the
mind of someone already grievously suffering can surely be no more difficult
than insinuating the idea of euthanasia; indeed, it could be all the more
manipulative if the insinuated hint was combined with a tacit flattery of
someone's capacity to act on his or her own.
As for the power of doctors, their general prestige as professionals who
by training and experience are widely thought better to understand matters
of life and death than the rest of us, and their capacity to give or withhold
1995]
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to medical care in this country, they pointed out "is currently too ineq-
uitable, and many doctor-patient relationships too impersonal, for us
to tolerate the risks of permitting active voluntary euthanasia." 4
When I first read these comments by Quill and Meier, my reac-
tion was: Why can't the very same thing be said about not tolerating
the risks of permitting assisted suicide? Shouldn't we either legalize
both assisted and active euthanasia or continue to prohibit both?
On reading the comments Quill and Meier made in 1992, it also
struck me that their approach to euthanasia was not very different
from mine. When it came to assisted suicide, they were what might be
called "act utilitarians" and I was what might be called a "rule utilita-
rian" (one who does not believe that the beneficial consequences of
individual acts are decisive when one makes public policy). But when
it came to euthanasia, all of us, it seemed, were inclined to be "rule
utilitarians."
That was 1992. Two years later, Drs. Quill and Meier took a de-
cidedly more "act utilitarian" approach. They no longer defended an
absolute prohibition against active euthanasia. Along with four
others, they co-authored an article endorsing what they euphemisti-
cally called "physician-assisted death," a term not limited to assisted
suicide. Under certain circumstances, they now maintained, individu-
als should be entitled to obtain active voluntary euthanasia as well:
To confine legalized physician-assisted death to assisted sui-
cide unfairly discriminates against patients with unbelievable
suffering who resolve to end their lives but are physically un-
able to do so. The method chosen is less important than the
careful assessment that precedes assisted death.55
Quill and Meier were not the only well-known commentators in
the field to shift their position on euthanasia. In 1993 Lawrence Gos-
tin, then the Executive Director of the American Society of Law,
Medicine and Ethics (and now a member of the Georgetown Law
Center faculty), proposed decriminalizing assisted suicide under cer-
tain conditions, but not active euthanasia under any circumstances
(evidently because he respected the bright line between active killing
lethal drugs, already establishes the power differential between themselves
and their patients.
In any event, the view held by Quill and Meier in 1992 that the "balance of
power" between physician and patient was more nearly equal in assisted suicide than
in euthanasia did not keep them from crossing the line between assisted suicide and
euthanasia two years later. See infra note 55 and accompanying text.
54. Quill et al., supra note 51, at 1381.
55. Franklin G. Miller et al., Sounding Board: Regulating Physician-Assisted Death,
331 NEw ENG. J. MED 119, 120 (1994).
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and "letting die.") 56 A year later, however, Gostin signed the same
article Doctors Quill and Meier did, concluding that the legalization
of "physician-assisted death" could not be limited to those patients
who possessed the capacity to carry out the final act themselves.-7
The fact that several participants in the debate on death and dy-
ing drew a distinct line between assisted suicide and active euthanasia
only to ignore that line within the span of a few years is further evi-
dence, I think, that the distinction between physician-assisted suicide
and physician-administered active voluntary euthanasia is too thin a
line to endure for very long.
LIBERALS, CONSERVATIVES AND "SLIPPERY SLOPE" ARGUMENTS
Professor Sedler wants us, and wants the courts, to focus on a
specific and narrow question: Do terminally ill patients have a right to
physician-assisted suicide? He does not want us, or the courts, to con-
sider the impact, if any, of an affirmative answer on "our views about
death and dying or the sanctity of life."58 He assures us that "we need
not worry about any 'slippery slope' ,.
Professor Sedler has made the point before. Indeed, he has gone
so far as to say that the kind of "slippery slope" arguments I have made
in the course of defending the absolute prohibition against assisted
suicide have "no place" in constitutional litigation and cannot be uti-
lized "to avoid" grappling with the specific and narrow question he
and his colleagues have framed. °
I must disagree. I do not believe a court can responsibly resolve
the constitutional issue Sedler and others have presented without con-
sidering the general implications of the asserted right. Surely ajudge
should not put on blinders and forge straight ahead without thinking
about the impact of her holding (however, "narrow" and "specific" it
may seem at first glance). Surely she should not "buy" an advocate's
argument without thinking hard about what it is she is really "buying."
I share the view that a court should rest its judgment on a princi-
ple of general significance that produces like results in like cases.6 If
so, how can a judge avoid considering what other fact situations not
presently before the court are (or are not) like cases?
Suppose a right to physician-assisted suicide for the terminally ill
were established. Is there any doubt that lawyers would soon appear in
56. See Gostin, supra note 50, at 98. "There remains almost universal agreement
in law and medicine," observed Gostin, "that letting die is ethical, while killing is not.
No such agreement exists on physician assisted suicide." Id.
57. See Miller et al., supra note 55, at 120.
58. Sedler, supra note 2, at 726.
59. Id. at 727.
60. See Sedler, supra note 35, at 20, 23.
61. See generally Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law,
73 HARv. L. Ray. 1 (1959).
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court arguing that (a) the new right could not be limited to the termi-
nally ill, but had to apply as well to others who would experience un-
acceptable suffering for many years; and that (b) the new right could
not be limited to assisted suicide, but had to include active euthanasia,
at least for those severely ill patients who were unable to perform the
"final act" themselves? If it is appropriate to transcend the "narrow"
and "specific" issue presented in a case once it is decided, and to start
building immediately on its implications, why is it improper to antici-
pate the implications of a soon-to-be-decided case and call the court's at-
tention to them?
I am well aware that a court must decide the case before it and
not some other one. But as Justice Felix Frankfurter has observed-
that does not mean that a case is dissociated from the past
and unrelated to the future. We must decide this case with
due regard for what went before and no less regard for what
may come after. 62
It is plain that proponents of assisted suicide (and active volun-
tary euthanasia) consider themselves the "liberals" or "civil libertari-
ans" in this debate. In light of this, I find their disdain for the
"slippery slope" argument somewhat unbecoming. For in other set-
tings, "liberals" have been quick to make similar "slippery slope"
arguments.
As the author of the leading law review article on "slippery slopes"
has pointed out, such arguments appear frequently in discussions
about freedom of speech and the rights of those suspected of crime.6"
I have little doubt, for example, that Professor Sedler and many other
"liberals" defended the Nazis' right to march to Skokie largely because
they feared that denying them First Amendment protection might
start us down a slippery slope-that "if the swastika and burning
crosses are banned today on good grounds, relatively innocuous sym-
bols may be banned tomorrow on not so good grounds."
64
The Skokie case may be viewed as a controversy between "act utili-
tarians," who wanted to focus on the particular facts of the case, and
"rule utilitarians," who preferred to dwell on the long-range implica-
tions for the First Amendment of denying the Nazis the right to
march. But this time it was clear that the "liberals" were the rule
utilitarians.
Only a day before this symposium was held, the New York Times
reported that a series of killings by terrorists had prompted the Israeli
government to authorize harsher interrogation of suspected Muslim
62. West Virginia State Bd. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 660-61 (1943) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting).
63. See Frederick Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HARv. L. REv. 361 (1985).
64. JOEL FEINBERG, OFFENSE TO OTHERS 92-93 (1985); see also Schauer, supra note
63, at 363.
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militants and that this decision had aroused the ire of various human-
rights groups.65 The Israeli government supported its position by
pointing to dramatic individual cases. It made what has been called
the "ticking bomb" argument-underscoring the need to resort to
torture to extract information that could prevent imminent killings.66
But a goodly number of Israeli "liberals" were unpersuaded that a very
few dramatic cases justified an exception to the absolute ban against
torture. They feared that once a crack appeared in the flat prohibi-
tion against torture, the crack would gradually widen. Most interroga-
tion situations, they emphasized, were "a far cry" from the "ticking
bomb" case.67 This controversy, too, may be viewed as one between
"act utilitarians" and "rule utilitarians." And once again the "rule utili-
tarians"-those making the slippery slope argument-were the
"liberals."68
I am well aware that, as Sissela Bok observed a quarter-century
ago, "slippery slope" or, as they are often called, "thin edge of the
wedge" arguments have been "used so often and for such dubious
purposes that they tend to be brushed aside as merely rhetorical. 69
But, added Professor Bok, if these arguments are seen as "expressions
of caution in the face of unknown future changes, there must be times
when the caution has turned out to be justified."70 The overuse or
misuse of the slippery slope or wedge argument on some occasions
does not justify its dismissal in other settings. Whenever such argu-
ments are deployed, "it will be necessary to test the reasonableness of
such a use within the context of the specific conflict."71
65. Joel Greenberg, Israel Permits HarsherInterrogation of Militants, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
17, 1994, at A6.
66. See id.
67. See id.
68. One might argue that if a "ticking bomb" case actually arose, the legal system
would somehow allow torture through the use of some subterfuge. Even so, it does
not follow that the "absolute prohibition" against torture should be repealed. It is
much easier to justify torture if one approaches the problem generally by balancing
the "interest" in banning torture against the "interest" in peace and order. On the
other hand, by refusing to acknowledge that we should balance the costs and benefits
of torture as a general matter, we strengthen the presumption against torture and
increase the likelihood that it will only be resorted to in the rarest and most compel-
ling situations. See the discussion in GUIDO CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATrrruDEs,
AND THE LAW 167 n.240 (1985) and Charles L. Black, Jr., Mr. Justice Black, the Supreme
Court, and the Bill of Rights, HARPER'S MAG., Feb. 1961, at 63, 67-68. Both commenta-
tors discuss how we should go about deciding whether the police may torture a pris-
oner to get him to reveal the location of a nuclear bomb when the police knew he has
hidden the bomb somewhere in a major city and the bomb is due to explode in a very
short time.





HeinOnline  -- 72 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 751 1994-1995
752 UNIVERSITY OF DETROIT MERCY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:735
I submit that the experience in the Netherlands suggests that the
use of the "slippery slope" argument is reasonable in the contex't of
assisted suicide and active euthanasia.
A survey commissioned by the Dutch government revealed that in
1990 (the year covered by the survey) there were 1,000 cases of active,
intentional termination of life without an explicit request from the
patient (nonvoluntary euthanasia).72 As would be the case in the
United States if current proposals were put into effect, the Dutch
guidelines for assisted suicide and active euthanasia "are dependent
upon the willingness of doctors to report what they do."" But "it is
evident that most do not, and certainly not those substantial numbers
who engage in nonvoluntary euthanasia."'74
Recently, in the Assen case (a case referred to by the name of the
city where it was tried), the Dutch Supreme Court extended the na-
tion's toleration for assisted suicide and euthanasia to patients who
are suffering psychological distress, but not physical (let alone termi-
nal) illness.v5 As Professor Herbert Hendin, the Executive Director of
the American Suicide Foundation, and a close observer of the Dutch
scene, has recently pointed out:
[T] he Assen case seemed to justify the concerns here as in
the Netherlands of a "slippery slope" that moves society inex-
orably from assisted suicide to euthanasia, from euthanasia
for the terminally ill to patients who are chronically ill, from
physical suffering to mental suffering, from voluntary re-
quests for euthanasia to killing at the discretion of the
physician. 6
When it comes to assisted suicide (and active euthanasia) the
United States is a considerable distance behind (or should one say,
ahead of) the Dutch. But developments in this country have not been
insignificant. "[I]n only a few years, the debate over euthanasia has
moved from acceptance of 'foregoing life-support' to serious consider-
ation of lethal acts."77 But we need not focus on this recent develop-
ment. Back in 1988, some time before the legal assault on the
distinction between active killing and "letting die" really got under-
way, Professor Laurence Tribe observed:
72. See Callahan & White, supra note 44; Herbert Hendin, Seduced by Death: Doc-
tors, Patients, and the Dutch Cure 10 ISSUES IN L. & MED. 123, 155 (1994);John Keown,
Euthanasia in the Netherlands: Sliding Down the Slippery Slope, in EUTHANASIA EXAMINED
261, 269, 275-76 (John Keown ed., 1995). See generally CARLOS F. GOMZ, REGULATING
DEATH: EUTHANASIA AND THE CASE OF THE NETHERLANDS (1991).
73. Callahan & White, supra note 44.
74. Id.
75. See Hendin, supra note 72, at 123.
76. Id. at 124.
77. Albert R. Jonsen, Physician-Assisted Suicide, 18 SEATT= U. L. REv. 459, 467
(1995).
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Recent court decisions have rejected many of the distinctions
commentators have proposed in earlier discussions about
the right to die: not only the distinction between ordinary
and extraordinary... treatment, but also the distinction be-
tween actively hastening death by terminating treatment and
passively allowing a person to die of a disease, between with-
holding and withdrawing life-sustaining treatment, and be-
tween the termination of artificial feedings and the
termination of other forms of life-sustaining treatment. 7
If, as has well been said, "the history of our activities and beliefs
concerning the ethics of death and dying is a history of lost distinc-
tions of former significance,"79 what reason is there to think that his-
tory will come to an end when we sanction assisted suicide for the
terminally ill? What reason is there to doubt that once we cross the
bridge between the termination of life-saving medical treatment and
the active intervention of another to bring about death, other lines of
demarcation will soon become other "lost distinctions of former
significance"?
SUICIDE AND ASSISTED SUICIDE VS. "LETIING DIE"
Professor Sedler has challenged those of us who are opposed to
any relaxation of the ban against assisted suicide to defend, "in terms of
constitutional doctrine and precedent," the distinction between the right
to die by refusing life-sustaining medical treatment and the right to
die by enlisting the aid of another in committing suicide." In re-
sponse, I should like to make several points.
First of all, "the major Anglo-American medical associations vigor-
ously maintain this distinction today"81 and most courts have had little
difficulty grasping its legal significance. 2 "As these courts have recog-
nized, the fact that the refusal of treatment and assisted suicide may
both lead to death does not mean that they implicate identical consti-
tutional concerns."8
3
78. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1364-65 (2d ed. 1988).
79. Thomas Mayo, Constitutionalizing the "Right to Die, 49 MD. L. REv. 103, 144
(1990).
80. See Sedler, supra note 2, at 729.
81. Edward J. Larson, Seeking Compassion in Dying: The Washington State Law
Against Assisted Suicide, 18 SEATLE U. L. REv. 509, 517 (1995) and medical groups
cited therein. See also Seth F. Kreimer, Does Pro-Choice Mean Pro-Kevorkian? An Essay on
Roe, Casey, and the Right to Die, 44 AM. U. L. REv. 803, 837-38 (1995).
82. See NEw YoRK STATE TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, and cases collected
therein.
83. Id. at 71.
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In Cruzan,"4 the only "right to die" case ever decided by the
United States Supreme Court, the Court "assume[d]" for purposes of
the case that a competent person had "a constitutionally protected
right" to refuse lifesaving treatment (even nutrition and hydration if
artificially delivered)." Nevertheless, the Court seemed to take for
granted the constitutionality of laws totally prohibiting assisted sui-
cide. The Court supported its assertion that a state has an undeniable
interest in the protection and preservation of human life-even the
life of a person in a persistent vegetative state" 6-by noting:
As a general matter, the states-indeed, all civilized na-
tions-demonstrate their commitment to life by treating
homicide as a serious crime. Moreover, the majority of states
in this country have laws imposing criminal penalties on one
who assists another to commit suicide. We do not think a
state is required to remain neutral in the face of an informed
and voluntary decision by a physically able adult to starve to
death.87
I share the view that this passage appears to endorse laws prohibiting
assisted suicide (as well as laws permitting state intervention to pre-
vent suicide)."8
A recent statement by the Coordinating Council on Life-Sus-
taining Medical Treatment Decision Making by the Courts typifies the
way many courts and commentators have defended the line between
"letting die" and actively intervening to promote or to bring about
death:
There are significant moral and legal distinctions between
letting die (including the use of medications to relieve suffer-
ing during the dying process) and killing (assisted suicide/
84. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). Although vari-
ous participants in the debate on death and dying have disagreed about the meaning
of some of the language in Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion and Justice
O'Connor's concurring opinion in Cruzan, the basic facts of the case and its outcome
in the United States Supreme Court are worth keeping in mind: Nancy Cruzan was in
a persistent vegetative state. Her parents wanted, and claimed they had the right, to
terminate the artificial feeding that was keeping their daughter alive. However, Ms.
Cruzan had not executed a "living will" or otherwise left clear instructions for ending
lifesaving treatment in such circumstances. Because there was no "clear and convinc-
ing" evidence of Ms. Cruzan's wishes, the Missouri Supreme Court rebuffed Ms.
Cruzan's parents. The United States Supreme Court upheld the state supreme court,
id. at 282: "In our view, Missouri has permissibly sought to advance [its interest in the
preservation of human life] through the adoption of a 'clear and convincing' stan-
dard of proof to govern such proceedings."
85. See id. at 279.
86. See id. at 280.
87. Id.
88. See Louis Michael Seidman, Confusion at the Border: Cruzan, "The Right to Die,"
and the Public/Private Distinction, 1991 Sup. CT. REv. 47, 53, 62; see also Larson, supra
note 81, at 511-12.
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euthanasia). In letting die, the cause of death is seen as the
underlying disease process or trauma. In assisted suicide/
euthanasia, the cause of death is seen as the inherently lethal
action itself.8 9
This "bare bones" statement of the argument becomes much
more persuasive, I think, when Daniel Callahan, the director and co-
founder of the renowned Hastings Center, explicates and amplifies it:
[T] here must be an underlying fatal pathology if allowing to
die is even possible. Killing, by contrast, provides its own fa-
tal pathology. Nothing but the action of the doctor giving
the lethal injection is necessary to bring about death.
[A judgment that further life-extending treatment is futile]
... is not principally ajudgment about a patient's life at all.
It is, instead, ajudgment about the limits of medical skills in
providing further patient benefit. It is a way of saying that,
because the limits of those skills have been reached, the pa-
tient may be allowed to die.
To call these judgments, and the ensuing omission of treat-
ment, "intending" death distorts what actually happens ....
[I]f I stop shovelling my driveway in a heavy snowstorm be-
cause I cannot keep.up with it, am I thereby intending a drive-
way full of snow?
Since death is biologically inevitable sooner or later, not a
consequence of our actions but outside of them, we can
hardly be said to "intend" death when we admit we can no
longer stop it.90
As Dr. Callahan suggests, "the refusal of life-sustaining treatment
is an integral dimension of medical practice .... 91 Indeed, as Calla-
han suggests, it is an indispensable part of medical practice. The dis-
tinction between "killing" and "letting die" may not be perfectly
logical, but, unlike assisted suicide or euthanasia, letting a patient die
at some point is a practical condition upon the successful operation of
medicine.
A society which prohibited the refusal of life-sustaining treatment
and enforced such a prohibition with any regularity would not be a
pleasant place in which to die (or live). Vast numbers of patients
would be "at the mercy of every technological advance."92 If people
89. GUIDELINES FOR STATE COURT DECISION MAKING IN LIFE-SUSTAINING MEDICAL
TREAMiENT CASES 145 (rev. 2d ed. 1993).
90. CALLAHAN, supra note 26, at 77-78.
91. See NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 74.
92. Id. at 75. As the Task Force observed:
[I]t is estimated that approximately 70 percent of all hospital and nursing
home deaths follow the refusal of some form of medical intervention. A
7551995]
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could decline possibly lifesaving treatment but not discontinue it once
initiated, many would probably not seek such treatment in the first
place. In short, as one commentator recently put it, "the only way we
can offer patients and doctors the chance to prolong life-use life-
sustaining treatment-is by also allowing them to decide when to
cease such efforts ....
A prohibition against the refusal of life-sustaining treatment
would not only impose a burden on many more people than does a
ban on assisted suicide,94 but would impose a far more severe burden.
Although it closes "[a]n avenue of escape," a ban on assisted suicide
does not totally occupy a person's life or make "affirmative use of his
body."9 However, to deny a person the right to be disconnected from
artificial life-support is to force one into
a particular, all-consuming, totally dependent, and indeed
rigidly standardized life: the life of one confined to a hospi-
tal bed, attached to medical machinery, and tended to by
medical professionals. It is a life almost totally occupied.
The person's body is, moreover, so far expropriated from his
own will, supposing that he seeks to die, that the most ele-
mental acts of existence-such as breathing, digesting, and
circulating blood-are forced upon him by an external
agency.
96
prohibition on the refusal of treatment would therefore require the wide-
spread of restraint of patients unwilling to submit to invasive procedures at
the end of their lives.
Id. at 74-75 (footnote omitted).
93. Giles R. Scofield, Exposing Some Myths About Physician-Assisted Suicide, 18 SEAT-
TLE U. L. Ruv. 473, 481 (1995).
94. [T] o the extent that laws prohibiting assisted suicide and euthanasia im-
pose a burden, they do so only for individuals who make an informed, com-
petent choice to have their lives artificially shortened, and who cannot do so
without another person's aid. As studies have confirmed, very few individu-
als fall into this group, particularly if appropriate pain relief and supportive
care are provided.
NEw YoRK STATE TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 72.
95. SeeJed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARv. L. REv. 737, 795 (1989).
Actually, Professor Rubenfeld is writing about suicide, not assisted suicide. But there
no longer are any criminal laws in this country prohibiting suicide or attempted sui-
cide. A ban on assisted suicide only imposes a burden on those individuals who want
to end their lives and cannot do so without another's aid. Evidently very few people
fall into this group. See discussion supra note 94.
96. Rubenfeld, supra note 95, at 795. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 287-88: (O'Conner, J.,
concurring) (citation omitted):
As the Court notes, the liberty interest in refusing medical treatment flows
from decisions involving the State's invasions into the body. Because our
notions of liberty are inextricably entwined with our idea of physical free-
dom and self-determination, the Court has often deemed state incursions
into the body repugnant to the interests protected by the Due Process
Clause.... The State's imposition of medical treatment on an unwilling
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I share the view of the New York State Task Force on Life and the
Law that it is "this right against intrusion-not a general right to con-
trol the timing and manner of death-that forms the basis of the con-
stitutional right to refuse life-sustaining treatment."97
Moreover, as Professor Seth Kreimer has observed, so far as the
dangers of mistake or abuse are concerned, "a right to refuse treat-
ment puts at risk only the lives of those who would die without treat-
ment," but "the approval of active euthanasia or assisted suicide would
extend the risk to the entire population."" Adds Kreimer:
Particularly with the emergence of cost controls and
managed care in the United States, the danger of tempting
health care providers to persuade chronic patients to mini-
mize costs by ending it all painlessly is no fantasy. The quan-
titative distinction between some and all can be a legitimate
predicate for the qualitative distinction between permission
and prohibition.99
I realize that many do not consider the arguments made in defense of
the distinction between suicide/assisted suicide and the refusal of life-
saving treatment completely satisfying. But the distinction between
active killing or active intervention to bring about death and "letting
die" has more to commend it than mere logic.
For one thing, the distinction represents an historical and prag-
matic compromise between the desire to let seriously ill people carry
out their wishes to end it all and the felt need to protect the weak and
the vulnerable. As Dean (now Judge) Guido Calabresi has observed,
when we must make tragic choices-choices that confront us when
fundamental beliefs clash-we seek solutions that "permit us to assert
competent adult necessarily involves some form of restraint and intrusion. A
seriously ill or dying patient whose wishes are not honored may feel a captive
of the machinery required for life-sustaining measures or other medical in-
terventions. Such forced treatment may burden that individual's liberty in-
terests as much as any state coercion.
97. NEv YoRK STATE TASK FoRcE REPORT, supra note 8, at 71 (footnote omitted);
see also Scofield, supra note 93, at 478 (footnote omitted):
The right not to be touched against one's wishes is the value that underlies
the principle of self-determination protected under the law in the name of
the "right to die." In the world of philosophy and ethics, this has meant
respecting a patient's negative right of noninterference-the right to be let
alone. Respecting that right requires forbearance; we must either not initi-
ate treatment or withdraw a treatment we have initiated. Whichever it is, we
are to back off.
Where the "right-to-die" consists of physician-assisted suicide, respecting
this right requires doctors to assist, not desist. Medical forbearance simply
will not produce the desired result.
98. Kreimer, supra note 81, at 841.
99. Id.
199.5]
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that we are cleaving to both beliefs in conflict."' 0 As good an exam-
ple as any of what Judge Calabresi had described is the way we have
dealt with the law and ethics of death and dying.
On the one hand, we want to respect patients' wishes, relieve suf-
fering, and put an end to seemingly futile medical treatment. Hence
we allow patients to refuse life-sustaining treatment. On the other
hand, we want to affirm the supreme value of life and to maintain the
salutary principle that the law protects all human life, no matter how
poor its quality. Hence the ban against assisted suicide and active vol-
untary euthanasia.
I venture to say that one of the purposes of the distinction be-
tween the termination of life support and assisted suicide (or active
voluntary euthanasia)-or at least one of its principal effects-is to
have it both ways. The two sets of values are in conflict, or at least in
great tension. Nevertheless, until now at any rate, we have tried to
honor both sets.
I realize that drawing a line between assisted suicide (or active
voluntary euthanasia) and "letting die" will not please every logician
or philosopher. But what line will?
This brings us to another factor at work in this area-a factor that
I think accounts for a good deal of the support for maintaining the
"historic divide" between "active killing" and "letting die."'' Unless
we carry the principle of "self-determination" or "personal autonomy"
or "control of one's own destiny" to its ultimate logic-assisted suicide
(and active euthanasia) by any competent individual who firmly re-
quests it for any reason the individual deems appropriate-we have to
draw a line somewhere along the way. But where? I submit that no inter-
mediate line, certainly not the one Sedler and his colleagues suggest,
would be any more defensible than the one we have now. So why
cross the line we have now?
I suspect that few, if any, have ever been in a better position than
Wayne County CircuitJudge Richard Kaufman to appreciate the diffi-
culties involved in drawing what I have called an "intermediate line."
In late 1993,Judge Kaufman became the first American judge ever to
hold squarely that there is a constitutional right to assisted suicide
(under certain conditions).1°2 Although his decision was ultimately
100. CALABRESI, supra note 68, at 88; cf. id. at 87-91. See also GUIDO CALABREsI, A
COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 172-77 (1982).
101. Cf Albert W. Alschuler, Reflection, in AcTIvE EUTHANASIA, RELIGION, AND THE
PUBLIC DEBATE 105, 108 (Martin Marty & Ron Hamel eds., 1991) (a publication of
The Park Ridge Center).
102. People v. Kevorkian, No. 93-11482, 1993 WL 603212 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Wayne
County Dec. 13, 1993). Judge Kaufman's opinion is discussed at considerable length
in Kamisar, The Last Bridge to Active Voluntary Euthanasia, supra note 48, at 240-44.
Professor Sedler and his ACLU colleagues were not directly involved in this case.
The ACLU and Dr. Jack Kevorkian have kept at some considerable distance from
each other.
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overturned,"'3 even his critics (and I am one of them) concede that
Judge Kaufman wrote a long, thoughtful, well-documented opinion.
I deem it noteworthy that Judge Kaufman drew a line neither (a)
between terminally ill people seeking to die by suicide and others
wishing to do so nor (b) between those experiencing severe "pain and
suffering" and others whose pain and suffering was, or could be,
brought under control. Rather, Judge Kaufman drew the "intermedi-
ate line" between the presence and absence of an "objective medical
condition" that was "extremely unlikely to improve."104
If an individual's quality of life was significantly impaired by such
a medical condition, even though it was not a life-threatening condi-
tion, the individual could exercise the newly established constitutional
right. But if an individual's quality of life was significantly diminished
for any other reason (e.g., disgrace, financial ruin, the death of a
spouse), she could not invoke the constitutional right-no matter
how competent she was or firm her desire to die.
10 5
Although there was some confusion about this, the line Judge
Kaufman wound up drawing was not a line between "rational" and "ir-
rational" suicide. Rather, it was a line between one category of "ra-
tional" suicide-where the would-be suicide's life was significantly
impaired by an irreversible medical condition-and other categories of
"rational" suicide.
Judge Kaufman did not draw the line simply between rational
and irrational suicide because he feared that "any form of rational sui-
cide that did not include the presence of an objective medical condi-
tion would be too close to irrational suicide."'0 6 If constitutional
protection were extended to all persons who harbored a rational wish
to die, he told us, "the possibility that irrational suicide would increase
is too great."10 7 Therefore, according to Judge Kaufman, a state not
only has the power to prohibit all classes of "irrational" suicide and
assisted suicide, but some classes of "rational" suicide and assisted sui-
cide as well (those where one's quality of life has not been impaired
by an objective medical condition).
Judge Kaufnan made a valiant effort to find a sensible legal solu-
tion to an excruciatingly hard problem. But if a judge can deny con-
stitutional protection to some forms of "rational" assisted suicide out of
103. In May of 1994 a two to one majority of the Michigan Court of Appeals ruled
that there was no constitutional right to assisted suicide, Hobbins v. Attorney Gen.,
518 N.W.2d 487 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994), and seven months later a five to two majority
of the Michigan Supreme Court announced its agreement with the court of appeals
on this point. People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714 (Mich. 1994) (consolidated with
Hobbins), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 714 (1995).
104. Kevorkian, No. 93-11482, 1993 WL 603212, at *18-19.
105. See id. at *19.
106. Id. at *18 (emphasis added).
107. Id.
7591995]
HeinOnline  -- 72 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 759 1994-1995
760 UNIVERSITY OF DETROIT MERCY LAW RE VIEW [Vol. 72:785
concern that unless this is done "irrational" assisted suicide might get
out of hand, why can't a legislature prohibit all forms of "rational"
assisted suicide on the same grounds?
After all, geriatric psychiatrists (who work with suicidal people
every day) and suicidologists (who perform "psychological autopsies"
of people who commit suicide) tell us that a suicide rarely occurs in
the absence of a major psychiatric disorder, and that this observation
holds for suicides among the elderly.108 Moreover, these experts un-
derscore the inability of depressed persons to recognize the severity of
their own symptoms and the failure of primary physicians to detect
major depression, especially in elderly patients.'0 9
As one authority has observed, we encourage suicide among the
elderly "by our neglect and indifference."110 As another commentator
has put it, " '[s]uicidal persons are succumbing to what they experi-
ence as an overpowering and unrelenting coercion in their environ-
ment to cease living.' "1"' Is it not fair to assume that these pressures
will intensify in a society that sanctions assisted suicide (and thereby
suicide as well)? Is it not fair to assume that once assisted suicide is a
lawful alternative and people are "doing it," and feel free to talk about
it, more people, especially the sick, the old and the vulnerable, will see
this route as a tempting way to spare both oneself and one's family
and friends the burden of serious illness and/or advanced age?"1 2
THE "ABORTION CASES": HOW EXPANSIVE IS THE CONCEPT
OF PRIVACY?.
Professor Sedler and his allies find support for their views in the
Supreme Court's abortion cases." 3 In Roe v. Wade," 4 the Court in-
formed us that a "right of privacy," which had earlier been invoked to
strike down restrictions on the use and distribution of contracep-
108. SeeJames H. Brown, et al., Is It Normal for Terminally Ill Patients to Desire Death ?,
143 AM.J. PSYCHIATRY 208, 210 (1986); Yeates Conwell & Eric D. Caine, Rational Sui-
cide and the Right to Die, 325 NEw ENG.J. MED. 1100, 1101 (1991); Herbert Hendin &
Gerald Klerman, Physician-Assisted Suicide: The Dangers of Legalization, 150 AM. J. Psy-
CHIATRY 143 (1993); Roberta Richardson, et al., Coping with the Suicidal Elderly: A Physi-
cian's Guide, GERIATRIcS, Sept. 1989, at 43-44.
109. See David C. Clark, "Rational" Suicide and People with Terminal Conditions orDisa-
bilities, 8 ISSUES IN L. & MED. 147, 155, (1992); Conwell & Caine, supra note 108, at
1101.
110. GEORGE H. COLT, THE ENIGMA OF SUICIDE 394 (1991).
111. Id. at 342 (quoting MENNO BOLDT, THE RIGHT TO SUICIDE (1985) (Suicide
Information and Education Centre Current Awareness Bulletin, 1 (2), at 1)).
112. For a discussion of "circumstantial" and "societal" manipulation in the con-
text of suicide, see M. Pabst Battin, Manipulated Suicide, in SUICIDE: THE PHILOSOPHI-
CAL ISSUES 169 (M. Pabst Battin & DavidJ. Mayo eds., 1980).
113. See Sedler, supra note 2, at 728-733. See also' Sedler, supra note 35, at 23-24.
114. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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tives," 5 "is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether
or not to terminate her pregnancy."" 6 The Court cleared the way for
its ultimate holding by rejecting the state's argument that "a fetus is a
person" within the meaning of the Constitution-"the word 'person',
as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the un-
born."'1 7 Although Roe did not involve the termination of a human
life (so far as the Court was concerned), Sedler and others have read
the case and its progeny very broadly to support a "right" or "liberty,"
under certain circumstances, to enlist the assistance of others in com-
mitting suicide.'
I agree with Professor Sedler that the constitutional answer to the
question he and his colleagues pose "must be found in applicable
Supreme Court doctrine and precedent.""' 9 But what are the relevant
precedents? (Why, for example, does Sedler totally ignore Bowers v.
Hardwick,2 ' a case which, so long as it remains on the books, greatly
reduces Roe's potential for expansion?) And how should we character-
ize the applicable doctrine?
"The laws struck down under the rubric of privacy have had a
peculiar tendency to gravitate around sexuality" 21 -"not 'sex' as
such, of course, but sexuality in the broad sense of that term: the
network of decisions and conduct relating to the conditions under
115. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438 (1972).
116. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-53. But the right is not absolute. Id. at 162-66. As a
general proposition, after fetal viability the state may proscribe abortion. Id. at 164-
65. As a general matter, before viability the state may not. Id. at 163-64. But "the State
has legitimate interests from the outset of the pregnancy in protecting the health of the
woman .... " Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2804 (1992) (emphasis
added).
Suppose, because of a pregnant woman's special disability or particular illness, an
abortion before fetal viability can only be performed at great risk to her life. Suppose,
further, that the woman still wants an abortion. I take it that under such circum-
stances the state could prevent the abortion from being performed despite the wo-
man's wishes.
If so, if a state can override a woman's choice when the abortion she desires
would jeopardize her life, does it not follow that, consistently with the abortion cases,
a state can ban a so-called medical procedure intended to and designed to end a per-
son's life? Does it not follow, too, that a state can block the active intervention of a
physician trying to promote or to bring about a patient's death? See Marc
Spindelman, Roe vs. Wade Recognizes No 'Right to Die, 'DETROIT NEWS, Oct. 16, 1994, at
3B.
117. Roe, 410 U.S. at 157-58.
118. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
119. Sedier, supra note 2, at 728.
120. 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding prohibition against consensual sodomy as
applied to homosexuals, even though the activity took place in private).
121. Rubenfeld, supra note 95, at 738.
1995]
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which sex is permissible, the social institutions surrounding sexual re-
lationships, and the procreative consequences of sex."1 22
Although the plaintiffs in Roe and its companion case 123 did not
even challenge the abortion restrictions as sex discriminatory, a grow-
ing number of commentators, including Judge (now Justice) Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, 24 have maintained that the best argument for the
right to abortion is based on principles of "sex equality," not "due
process" or "privacy."1 25 As then Judge Ginsburg noted (in a lecture
delivered shortly before her nomination to the United States Supreme
Court), in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,126 which reaffirmed Roe, the ma-
jority "added an important strand to the Court's opinions on abor-
tion"-it "acknowledged the intimate connection between a woman's
'ability to control [her] reproductive li[fe]' and her 'ability [to] par-
ticipate equally in the economic and social life of the Nation.' "12'
"Laws restricting abortion so dramatically shape the lives of wo-
men, and only of women," Professor Laurence Tribe has observed,
122. Id. at 744. See also RicHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 325 (1992):
In a series of decisions between 1965 and 1977 [Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973); and Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S.
678 (1977)], the Supreme Court created a constitutional right of sexual or
reproductive autonomy, which it called privacy.
All four cases, addsJudge Posner, id. at 343, can be "viewed as decisions motivated by
a concern with the burdens of unwanted pregnancy, a concern that resonates with the
women's movement and thus connects with the Court's decisions invalidating sexually
discriminatory legislation under the equal protection clause ......
123. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
124. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rv. 1185,
1199-1202 (1992); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in
Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REv. 375, 382, 386 (1985).
125. See CALB. ~sI, supra note 68, at 99-102; CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CON-
STITUTION 272-85 (1993); TRIBE, supra note 78, at 1353-55; Kenneth L. Karst, Foreword:
Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1, 57-59 (1977);
Kreimer, supra note 81, at 849; Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality
UnderLaw, 100 YALE L.J. 1281, 1319 (1991); Frances Olsen, Unraveling Compromise, 103
HARv. L. REv. 105, 117-26 (1989); Giles R. Scofield, Rethinking Roe, 8 TRENDS IN
HEALTH CARE, L. & ETHics 17, 19-20 (Summer, 1993); Reva Siegel, Reasoning From the
Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44
STAN. L. REV. 261, 350-80 (1992); David A. Strauss, Abortion, Toleration and Moral Uncer-
tainty, 1992 Sup. CT. REv. 1, 18-22. See also POSNER, supra note 122, at 339-40 (recog-
nizing that "focus" of Roe's legal defenders has "shifted to the equal protection
clause," but questioning the adequacy of this approach); cf. Donald H. Regan, Rewrit-
ingRoe v. Wade, 77 MicH. L. REv. 1569, 1618-42 (1979) (contending that a pregnant
woman is a "potential Samaritan" vis-a-vis her fetus, and should not be treated differ-
ently from other potential Samaritans).
126. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
127. Ginsburg, Speaking in aJudicial Voice, supra note 124, at 1199 (quoting Casey,
505 U.S. at 856). On this point, the controllingJustices in Casey (O'Connor, Kennedy
and Souter, JJ.) spoke for the Court. See also 505 U.S. at 928 (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring): "[A] State's restrictions on a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy also
implicate constitutional guarantees of gender equality."
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"that their denial of equality hardly needs elaboration."'28 Continues
Tribe:
While men retain the right to sexual and reproductive
autonomy, restrictions on abortion deny that autonomy to
women. Laws restricting access to abortion thereby place a
real and substantial burden on women's ability to participate
in society as equals. Even a woman who is not pregnant is
inevitably affected by her knowledge of the power relation-
ships created by a ban on abortion. 129
The more the right to abortion is grounded on "sexual equality,"
or the more Roe is justified on that basis, the less comfort that right
offers proponents of a constitutional right to assisted suicide. But
even those who continue to view the right to abortion as based on
"privacy" or "personhood" must take into account how the scope and
meaning of these rather abstract concepts are affected by the decision
in Bowers v. Hardwick.'
I would not have joined Justice White's opinion for the Court in
Hardwick. I agree with former Solicitor General Charles Fried that the
opinion White wrote upholding the constitutionality of a state law
criminalizing consensual sodomy, as applied to homosexuals, is "stun-
ningly harsh and dismissive."' ButJustice White spoke for five mem-
bers of the Court. Any discussion of the breadth and potential for
expansion of such concepts as "privacy" and "personhood" which ig-
nores Hardwick (as does Professor Sedler, and as did Judge Rothstein
when she invalidated an anti-assisted suicide law)' 3 2 is seriously
incomplete.
"The Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy,"
observed the Hardwick Court, per Justice White, "when it deals with
judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in
the language or design of the Constitution."' More specifically, the
Court's prior "privacy" cases had recognized three categories of pro-
tected activity-marriage, procreation, and family relationships-but
"[n]o connection" between "homosexual activity" and any of these
categories was demonstrated.'
As Professor Jed Rubenfeld has observed:
128. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTEs 105 (1990).
129. Id
130. See 478 U.S. at 186.
131. CHARLEs FRIED, ORDER AND LAW 82 (1991). For powerful criticism of Hard-
wick, see TRIBE, supra note 78, at 1421-35. As Professor Tribe acknowledges, he argued
the case in the Supreme Court for the losing party.
132. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
133. 478 U.S. at 194.
134. Id. at 191.
1995] 763
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Justice White neither sought nor found any unifying princi-
ple underlying his three categories. It was as if the Court had
said, "We in the majority barely understand why even these
three areas are constitutionally protected; we simply ac-
knowledge them and note that they are not involved here."
The device of compartmentalizing precedent is an old juris-
prudential strategy for limiting unruly doctrines. The effect
here is that, after Hardwick, we know that the right to privacy
protects some aspects of marriage, procreation, and child-
rearing, but we do not know why. By identifying three dispa-
rate applications ungrounded by any unifying principle, the
majority effectively severed the roots of the privacy doctrine,
leaving only the branches .... 135
I do not deny that a colorable argument may be made that the
"right of privacy" invoked in Roe includes the "right" or "liberty" of a
person to choose whether to continue to live until death comes natu-
rally or to hasten death by obtaining the active intervention of an-
other. But a much stronger argument may be made, I think, that the
"right of privacy" encompasses the autonomy of sexual activity and
relationships.
As Justice Blackmun wrote in Hardwick, "sexual intimacy is 'a sen-
sitive, key relationship of human existence, central to... the develop-
ment of human personality' "; "individuals define themselves in a
significant way through their intimate sexual relationships with
others" and "much of the richness of a relationship will come from
the freedom an individual has to choose the form and nature of these
intensely personal bonds."186 But Justice Blackmun wrote in dissent.
I share Justice Blackmun's view that before it can punish its peo-
ple for their actions, a state "must do more than assert that the choice
they have made is an 'abominable crime not fit to be named among
Christians.' 1137 1 agree, too, with another Hardwick dissenter, Justice
Stevens, that "the fact that the governing majority in a State has tradi-
tionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient rea-
son for upholding a law prohibiting the practice .... ,"138 However, as
the recent report of the New York State Force on Life and the Law
well demonstrates, any state that prohibits assisted suicide can advance
justifications for its legislation that go well beyond the law's conform-
ity to religious doctrine or "morality."' 9
135. Rubenfeld, supra note 95, at 748-49. See also POSNER, supra note 122, at 341
(asserting that Hardwick "froze the constitutional right of privacy").
136. 478 U.S. at 205 (Blackmun J., joined by Brennan, Marshall and Stevens, JJ.,
dissenting).
137. Id. at 199-200.
138. 478 U.S. at 216 (Stevens, J., joined by Brennan and Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
139. Among the reasons the Task Force gave for resisting even a very limited form
of physician-assisted suicide (or active voluntary euthanasia) were:
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In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 4 ' in the course of reaffirming Roe,
the Court spoke at one point about "the right to define one's own
concept of existence" and one's concept of "the mystery of human
life" as being "at the heart of liberty."' 41 As did Judge Rothstein in
Compassion in Dying,42 Sedler finds much solace in this capacious lan-
guage. 143 The language constitutes the last two sentences of a long
paragraph. I would like to quote the entire paragraph, including the
first four sentences:
Our law affords constitutional protection to personal deci-
sions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family
relationships, child rearing, and education. Our cases recog-
nize "the right of the individual, married or single, to be free
from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to
bear or beget a child." Our precedents "have respected the
private realm of family life which the state cannot enter."
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal
choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to
personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty
[1] Illness is a quintessential state of vulnerability [and p]atients bring this
vulnerability to their relationship with physicians .... As with other "treat-
ments" judgments about when and for whom assisted suicide and euthanasia
are provided would be managed principally by physicians, not their patients.
NEw YoRK STATE TASK FoRcF REPORT, supra note 8, at 121.
[2] In light of the pervasive failure of our health care system to treat pain
and diagnose and treat depression, legalizing assisted suicide and euthanasia
would be profoundly dangerous for many individuals who are ill and vulner-
able, [especially] for those who are elderly, poor, socially disadvantaged, or
without access to good medical care.
Id. at ix.
[3] Out of benevolence or from sheer frustration or exhaustion, [relatives]
may suggest or encourage the patient to accept assisted suicide or euthanasia
[and] [m]otivated by a sense of guilt or abandonment, many patients will
feel that they have no choice once the option is presented. Indeed, if [these
options] are widely available, patients may feel obligated to consider [them]
to alleviate the burden their illness and continued life imposes on those clos-
est to them.
Id. at 124. And finally,
[4] [A]ssisted suicide and euthanasia are closely linked; as [shown by the
experience in the Netherlands, where a lethal injection is preferred by both
doctors and patients,) once assisted suicide is embraced, euthanasia will
seem only a neater and simpler option to doctors and their patients.
Id. at 145 (footnote omitted). See also supra notes 14-15 and accompanying quotations
from the NEw YoRK STATE TAsK FoRCE REORT.
140. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
141. Id. at 851.
142. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454, 1459-61 (W.D. Wash.
1994), rev'd, 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1995). The ChiefJudge and ten other members of
the Ninth Circuit are scheduled to rehear this case en banc. 62 F.3d 299 (1995).
143. See Sedler, supra note 2, at 728.
1995]
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protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of
liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence,
of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human
life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attrib-
utes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of
the State."
This paragraph does contain some sweeping language. But I
think such language can plausibly be read as explaining why "these mat-
ters"-"personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contra-
ception" and "family relationships" or, more summarily, "the private
realm of family life"-have been given constitutional protection.
Viewed in isolation, the language about "defin[ing] one's own
concept of existence" and "of the mystery of human life" does seem
breathtaking. Literally, it would cover the right of terminally ill people
to enlist the assistance of another in committing suicide. But literally
it would also cover the right of any competent person-physically ill or
not-to enlist the aid of another in suicide. 145
Professor Sedler maintains that the right to define one's concept
of existence (and to make basic decisions about one's bodily integrity)
''surely must include" the right of terminally ill persons to obtain
assistance in ending their lives,"' but not the right of anybody else to
do so.147 Why not?
I understand how one can read the passage quoted above nar-
rowly (limiting it to reproductive rights and related matters) or read it
broadly (including death and dying). But I fail to see how one can
read it the way Sedler does.
If, as Sedler seems to say, the right to "define one's concept of
existence" includes the right to end one's existence with the active
assistance of another, and if, as he also seems to say, the right to "de-
fine one's own concept.., of the mystery of human life" includes the
right to end one's interest in life and its mystery with the active assist-
ance of another, why are these rights limited to the terminally ill?
Either the language quoted above refers only to personal decisions
relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, child rearing and
the like, or it refers to all that plus personal decisions relating to sui-
cide and suicide assistance. If the latter, why doesn't everybody have the
144. Casey, 505 U.S. at 851 (citations omitted; second emphasis added.)
145. As Judge John Noonan observed for a two to one majority in Compassion in
Dying.
If at the heart of the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment is this
uncurtailable ability to believe and to act on one's deepest beliefs about life,
the right to suicide and the right to assistance in suicide are the prerogative
of at least every sane adult.
49 F.3d 591.
146. See Sedler, supra note 2, at 728.
147. Id. at 727.
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right to define his concept of existence or his concept of the mystery
of life?
Why are these awesome rights denied to the great majority of us
because our lives are of "indefinite duration"?14 8 Why, if people so
wish, can't they change that? Why, if they so desire, can't people bring
a life of "indefinite duration" to a definite and abrupt close? Is the
choice whether to end one's life and how to do so "central to the liberty
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment "  or is it not?
A reading of "the right to define one's own concept of existence"
language broad enough to cover assisted suicide would be broad
enough to cover a great many other things. It would surely cover the
autonomy of sexual activity and relationships, and it would do so more
easily than it would embrace assisted suicide. Moreover, the connec-
tion between "homosexual activity" and the categories of activity al-
ready protected by the "privacy" cases seems much closer than the
relationship between assisted suicide and categories of activity already
protected. So far as I am aware, however, nobody has suggested that
Casey overrules Bowers v. Hardwick.
As a panel of the Ninth Circuit observed, in reversing a federal
district judge who had relied heavily on the same spacious language
that Sedler and his colleagues do:
The language taken from Casey, on which the district court
pitched its principal argument, should not be removed from
the context in which it was uttered. Any reader of judicial
opinions knows they often attempt a generality of expression
and a sententiousness of phrase that extend far beyond the
problem addressed.... To take [a few lines] out of an opin-
ion over thirty pages in length dealing with the highly
charged subject of abortion and to find these [few lines] "al-
most prescriptive" in ruling on a statute proscribing the pro-
motion of suicide is to make an enormous leap, to do
violence to the context, and to ignore the differences be-
tween the regulation of reproduction and the prevention of
the promotion of killing a patient at his or her request.' 50
148. See id. at 726-27:
[A]s to assisted suicide, of course the state can constitutionally prohibit as-
sisting a suicide in the ordinary sense of the term-that is, by providing
assistance in ending a life that is otherwise of indefinite duration.... [T]he
principle [that the government has the power to protect us from ourselves]
would be relied on by the courts to sustain a ban on assisted suicide in the
ordinary sense of the term.
149. See supra note 144 and accompanying quote from Casey.
150. Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 590 (two to one majority per Noonan, J.). As
indicated earlier, the Ninth Circuit is scheduled to rehear this case en banc. 62 F.3d
299 (1995).
1995]
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I do not think we should read too much into the soaring language
found in one small segment of a long opinion. Although it "pointedly
reaffirmed the 'essential holding' of Roe v. Wade that abortions prior
to fetal viability may not be criminalized,"'' 1 Casey "notably retreats
from Roe."' 52 By upholding several provisions of a state act that
imposed restrictions on reproductive freedom that "could not have
survived strict adherence to Roe,"' the Court "once again invited
state legislatures to regulate and sharply restrict access to legal
abortions."'5 4
Moreover, in reaffirming Roe, the Casey majority relied heavily on
the rule of stare decisis. Absent "the most compelling reason to reex-
amine a watershed decision," the majority told us, to overrule Roe
"under fire" would "subvert the Court's legitimacy beyond any serious
question."155
Finally, the three controlling jurists, Justices O'Connor, Kennedy
and Souter, (none of whom had been on the Court when Roe was
decided) made an extraordinary statement:
We do not need to say whether each of us, had we been
Members of the Court [when Roe was decided], would have
concluded, as the Roe Court did, that [the weight of the
State's interest in protecting the potentiality of life] is insuffi-
cient to justify a ban on abortions prior to viability.... The
matter is not before us in the first instance, and coming as it
does after nearly 20 years of litigation in Roe's wake we are
satisfied that the immediate question is not the soundness of
Roe's resolution of the issue, but the precedential force that
must be accorded to its holding.' 56
All things considered, I believe the Court that reaffirmed Roe in 1992
was bent on bringing an old constitutional war to an end-not pre-
paring to fight a new one.
A FINAL THOUGHT
"[E]very person in Holland has free access to health care" and
thus "concern about America's 34 million uninsured citizens-several
times greater than the entire population of Holland-does not come
into the picture.""7 Nor do "the feelings, pressures, and fears of mil-
151. Kathleen Sullivan, Foreword: TheJustices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARv. L.
REv. 22, 27 (1992).
152. Ginsburg, Speaking in aJudicial Voice, supra note 124, at 1208.
153. Id. at 1199.
154. The Supreme Court, 1991 Term, 106 HARv. L. REv. 19, 201 (1992).
155. 505 U.S. at 851; see also id. at 868-69.
156. Id. at 871.
157. AHRONHEIM & WEBER, supra note 21, at 90-91.
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lions of other Americans who may not have adequate coverage to pay
for relevant services."158
I agree with Professor Giles Scofield that -
The moral issue of our day is not whether to enable or pre-
vent a few individuals' dying in the comfort of their home in
the presence of their private physicians. The moral issue of
our day is whether to do something about our immoral sys-
tem of care, in which treatment is dispensed according to a
principle best characterized as that of economic
apartheid.159
As my former colleague, Robert Burt, recently observed, at a time
when many millions of Americans lack adequate health care and Con-
gress has refused to do much about it, "it would be ironic if the judici-
ary selected physician-assisted suicide as the one health care right that
deserves constitutional status."160
158. Id. at 91.
159. Scofield, supra note 93, at 491.
160. Robert A. Burt, Death Made Too Easy, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 16, 1994, at A15.
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